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On the Constitutive Performativity
of the Law of Capital
Marco Goldoni
University of Glasgow, Scotland
There is something truly insightful about The Code of Capital. This is not only because
throughout it the analysis is underpinned by the observation that the vast majority of
accounts of the birth and development of capital(ism) have been oblivious – or at best
superficially aware – of its legal fabric. Either the law has been reduced to an instru-
ment for pursuing economic ends, as it happens in many instances within the Law &
Economics movement, or it has been described as an epiphenomenon overdetermined
by economic rationality according to many materialist explanations. Instead, Pistor’s
account illuminates how law literally makes capital. In order to prove this startling
claim, Pistor’s first move is to disentangle the concept of capital from those concep-
tions that represent it either as the dialectic (riddled by contradictions) between factors
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of production on one hand, and the idea that capital is a process of progressive com-
modification of everything human and non-human, on the other hand. It should be
quickly added that she does not deny that commodification actually happens in the
creation of capital (and law is obviously involved in that). The problem is that com-
modification is far from sufficient to explain how capital produces wealth. In other
words, capital cannot be defined only on the basis of the formation and circulation of
commodities. There is a quid to it that the process of commodification cannot account
for. Capital is not only wealth extracted from social relations and maintained through
competitive markets. There has to be another ingredient to be added to the mix for
bringing capital to life. And this ingredient is provided by the operations of law. For
these reasons, from a methodological perspective, we are invited ‘to shift the attention
from class identity and class struggle to the question of who has access to and control
over the legal code and its masters: the landed elites; the long-distance traders and
merchant banks; the shareholders of corporations that own production facilities or
simply hold assets behind a corporate veil’ (Pistor, 2019: 8). Instead, the suggestion
is to look at how law encodes capital by putting some assets on ‘legal steroids’ (Pistor,
2019: 11). This is an interesting starting point, as it allows Pistor to avoid the thorny
and ambiguous language of value and to focus on a more clearly defined field iden-
tified by formal legal operations. An object (it seems any object) is potentially an asset
that can be transformed into a source of wealth by a process of legal coding. Hence, law
operates as the ‘magic’ factor in transforming assets into wealth. Accordingly, to grasp
how capital is generated it is necessary to understand this legal technique of transfor-
mation through assemblage.
As is examined in several chapters of the book, this is a technique offered by a
specific body of professionals who, through the mastery of a technical language, bestow
four legal attributes on an asset and, in this way, bootstrap wealth into existence. Pistor
distils the most fundamental legal components of capital and explains the nature of their
peculiar function. The identification of these four attributes and their application to
different case studies is one of the most important achievements of this book. The legal
coding assembles these attributes with a view to obtaining a number of effects on assets.
These attributes are mostly managed by what traditionally have been private law mod-
ules: property law, contract law, trust, intellectual property, the law of securities and
bankruptcy law, though the shadow of the State always looms large behind this set of
legal categories. Still, given the creativity of law, there is nothing exhaustive in the list of
private law tools for the making of capital.
Looking at the four attributes illuminates important aspects of capital. The first
two attributes are priority and universality. Priority applies to the hierarchy of
claims over an asset. It shows two essential aspects of capital: first, the fact that
it is fundamentally a relation of credit/debt, and, secondly, that the privilege and
priority of some creditor over others is its essential component. Universality makes
sure that these claims will be valid erga omnes. Universality shows another crucial
feature of capital: it cannot materialize if there is no third party to ensure that
priority claims can be enforced against everyone else. To avoid any misunderstand-
ing: the notion of the third here does not define the legal nature of an institution. It
rather ensures that what is already a legal institution becomes also part of the code
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of capital. However, priority and universality by themselves are not enough to
generate capital. While priority and universality would be sufficient to commodify
goods, for Pistor, they do not yet engender capitalism in its full modality. The other
two legal attributes of durability and convertibility have to be inserted in the picture.
The former ensures that priority is protected over time from too many creditors,
while the latter gives access to legal tender, ensuring a link with an asset (state
currency) whose nominal value is not subject to fluctuation.
One of the most original theses of the book is that the history of capitalism is one
constant deployment of these four attributes in different combinations. Such an approach
provides a powerful angle of observation to Pistor, as she can basically reconstruct the
development of modern capitalism according to this interpretative scheme. The deep
legal structure of capital is therefore the same throughout its various stages, and this is
more fundamental than, for example, changes in the modes and relations of production.
In a nutshell, capital is legally characterized by the entrenchment of privileges (Pistor
calls it the ‘feudal calculus’).
Nonetheless, Pistor is also clear in stating that there are differences between capital as it
is shaped in the middle ages, in the industrial age and in the time of financialisation. At this
level, an interesting argument can be inferred from the numerous case studies analyzed in
the book. Although Pistor does not mention it explicitly, two aspects explain why certain
assets acquire or lose value in different epochs. The first one is that the coding of certain
assets make possible the emergence of new forms of wealth. A classic case is the rise of the
corporation over land ownership as the main source of value. The second aspect is that
each epoch of capitalism can be seen as the outcome of a different mix of the four modules.
For example, ‘for financial assets, convertibility is more important than durability, indeed,
it is an effective substitute’ (Pistor, 2019: 15). Other epochs have seen a different amalga-
mation of these four modules and this has also changed the understanding of the private
law institutions employed for obtaining the right mix. The point forcefully made by Pistor
is that different forms of capitalism might have been related to various and changing types
of social relations, but the qualifying element has always been the mix of the four legal
attributes. It is no surprise, then, that legal expertise is a major protagonist of this story. It is
the lawyers of the merchants or the big law firms of financial capital that gave capital its
form. They are the true masters of the code.
This reconstruction of the law of capital relies heavily on a certain conception of
the legal order and its institutions. While Pistor has provided a healthy and valuable
array of arguments for appreciating the importance of law in creating capital, it
seems that a lot of work – perhaps, too much – is demanded of law. Two aspects of
this demanding conception shall be outlined in what follows. The first maintains that
the law is a constitutive and rather malleable instrument. Law as code comes across
as a performative which can transform any asset into wealth by virtue of its own
performance. The activity and expertise of lawyers are crucial for the performativity
of law. One can spot remarkable parallels here with the work of the late Yan
Thomas, historian of Roman law. Thomas noted that Roman law marks the auton-
omization of the legal order and of its specific performance: putting social relations
into form through legal description. His intuition is that law is not the instrument in
the hands of a previously constituted and naturalized owner (a classic representation
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of Roman Law: see Schiavone, 2012), but a ritual which qualifies things and con-
nects them to persons. Law is what makes things res iuris. Quite tellingly, Thomas
expands on the idea that the word that denotes things (res) is the same that describes
the legal procedure for settling conflicts. In Thomas’ reading, law is a performative
that names some things as economically valuable and others as outside the sphere of
commerce. This original division allows certain things to become marketable. The
division in itself is not based on a strict ontology, but it is the product of the legal
technique par excellence: fictio legis (Thomas, 2011: 133–186). Thomas’ lesson is
that law can transform assets into appropriable and valuable things. It does not say
much about the type of value and about the process of valorization undergirding it.
This is the case because his interest lies more in the description of the operations of
law than in understanding valorization.
Pistor’s description of the performative virtues of the legal order echoes Thomas’
reflections. An example can illustrate how far the performative operations of the law
can reach. With a remark critical of those approaches that see capital fundamentally as
a social relation, Pistor notes that even labor, ‘with a little bit of engineering [ . . . ] can
easily be turned into K (capital)’ (Pistor, 2019: 11). The performative force of the law
is displayed at its maximum power: ‘many a freelancer, for example, has discovered
that she can capitalize her labor by establishing a corporate entity, contributing her
services to it in kind and taking out dividends as the corporation’s shareholder in lieu of
a salary’ (Pistor, 2019: 11). Under this account, law can manipulate the factors of
production and even reverse them. The description of the relevant social relation itself
is a legal exercise.
The risk with this type of reconstruction is that the pendulum swings completely to the
other side of the spectrum, where the law does all the work. Crucially, the performative
thesis entails that social reality is created by law as a self-description of itself. There
seems to be no social remainder beyond the legal description. This position also implies a
certain degree of malleability of legal norms as well. Their assemblage and
re-combination are feasible because they are just forms, relatively unconstrained by the
social context. Hence, the formal legal norms ought to be the main object of study. But,
as in the example of labor, the legal norms that declare gig economy employees as self-
employed might not be enough to make those ‘workers’ really autonomous; rather they
seem to hide their de facto condition as wage workers (see Dukes, 2020; Prassl, 2018).
The failure to couple the analysis of the relevant legal norms with social relations runs
the risk of producing a disembedded type of legal analysis that misses out on the
dynamics of the relevant social practices.2
The same problem surfaces in another important theoretical contribution made by
Pistor, that is, the recovery and renewal of the important tradition of institutionalism. In
cooperation with other authors (Deakin et al., 2017), Pistor has revived and updated the
insights of institutionalist economists (see Commons, 1924). The recovery of this intel-
lectual tradition has made the role of law even more pronounced. In fact, legal institu-
tionalists have put forward a legal understanding of institutions like contract, marriage,
property, the firm, and many others. This is particularly true, according to the institu-
tionalists, of capitalist societies as they are based on social rules, and the vast majority of
the latter are either created or sanctioned by law (Deakin et al., 2017: 189). Such a view
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remains perfectly consistent with the one expounded in The Code of Capital. The con-
stitutive view entails that given that certain institutions are the building blocks of capit-
alism and they are also legal formations, then the legal perspective has a privileged
access to the reality of capitalism. Yet, in this way it is assumed that the legal nature of
the institution makes legal rationality predominant within the sphere of action regulated
by it. Accordingly, the best way to address distortions or abuses in the realm of the
political economy is by manipulating and transforming the legal form. Given that the
latter is constitutive, tweaking it will engender transformations of the relevant economic
actions as well. It is clear that the message conveyed by this type of institutionalism is
mostly directed to economists and political economists who have underestimated the
function of law for a long time. However, the risk is, once again, that we move from a
superficial and ineffective view of the law as an economic epiphenomenon to a perspec-
tive that sees social reality (in a capitalist society) constructed almost entirely by the
codification and the assemblage of legal institutions. Such a move is based on a con-
ception of the law that ultimately is not socially embedded. The problem arises because
the institution is conceived as fundamentally made by a hierarchy of legal norms. While
it is undeniable that institutions contain defining legal norms, their connection with
social relations is also constitutive and cannot be ignored. Institutions are couplings or
hybrids (but see Pistor, 2013, for an investigation of the hybridity of institutions):
contract, for example, is both an economic and a legal institution. The logic of action
shaped by the institution is not driven only by legal norms (though they clearly have an
impact on it) but by economic expectations as well (Teubner, 2017: 325). While most of
the rules of contract are formalized legally, the point of the practice of contracting cannot
be fully described only from a formalist legal perspective. Hence, a change in the formal
legal rules might ‘irritate’ the underlying logic of action of another subsystem, but it
would not be enough to produce lasting and impactful effects.
Notes
1. Katharina Pistor (2019), The Code of Capital: How the Law Creates Wealth and Inequality.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
2. See the recent decision of the French Court of Cassation (March 4, 2020) on the status of an
Uber driver, which follows a wave of other European courts on the same topic. The Court
confirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal and stated that it is essential to focus, for
determining the status of the worker, on a number of legal and factual aspects: ‘the relationship
of legal subordination is characterized by the performance of a job under the authority of an
employer who has the power to give orders and instructions, to oversee performance thereof,
and to sanction the subordinate for any breaches’ (paragraph 8).
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(De)coding Capital in the Periphery
Iagê Z Miola
Federal University of São Paulo (UNIFESP), Brazil
As the numerous reviews published worldwide suggest, The Code of Capital can be
considered a landmark for socio-legal scholars interested in the study of the imbrications
between law and the economy. In this book Katharina Pistor provides a refreshing theory
of the roles of law in capitalism, that is, in creating wealth and inequality. Pistor’s
approach resonates with the old institutionalists in how it places legal institutions as
central to the functioning of capitalism. It nevertheless adds new flavor to the under-
standing that capital works through law, both in devising novel categories to conceptua-
lize and explain how law is central, and by updating the analysis of capitalism
empirically to the current period of financial domination. Pistor does that by taking
seriously the power of legal reasoning and legal discourse in shaping power relations,
thus avoiding the pitfalls of treating law as pure instrumentalization of power.
The book’s main argument is radical in the way it explains the relationship between
law and capitalism, as it locates law at the roots of capital – neither as an epiphenomenal
element, nor as being unidirectionally conditioned by the economy. For Pistor, capital
comes to existence and can reproduce itself only by a sort of alchemy performed by
lawyers through which different assets – be it physical objects such as land and natural
resources, or immaterial ones such as claims, skills and ideas – acquire special attributes
in respect to other assets: priority, durability, convertibility and universality. Without
these attributes, asset holders can hardly produce wealth from it, store this generated
wealth over time, or convert it into state money and claim legitimate control over it
against everyone else. Lawyers turn these attributes into assets by deploying what she
defines as ‘legal devices’ or ‘legal modules’ (p. 3) – broadly speaking, legal institutions
and ideas – available in private law: notably property rights, contract, collateral, trust,
corporate, and bankruptcy law. These modules are combined and recombined by law-
yers, enabling wealth to be privately accumulated and protected over time and against
others.
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Pistor’s analysis thus opens up room for understanding wealth accumulation in capit-
alism – and thus inequality – not as the pure product of economic factors, but actually of
institutions – legal ones, mostly – and how they are designed and deployed – by lawyers,
mostly. More importantly, these attributes confer ‘an exorbitant privilege’ (p. 19) on
capital through law, as capital holders enjoy ‘a comparative advantage in accumulating
wealth over others’ (p. 4). Pistor thus reveals that a ‘feudal calculus’ is still ‘alive and
kicking’ (p. 6) in modern law produced within democratic states, which means that some
assets and their holders have certain privileges in respect to others – they will have
priority, they will endure over time, they will be more easily converted into money and
they will have such capacities against anyone else. Through the analysis of how different
assets have been historically coded by law to gain these special attributes, Pistor’s book
provides evidence for the idea that although capitalism relies on the rhetoric of equality
and merit that is pervasive of the modern legal grammar, it is actually a system of
privileges instituted and perpetuated by law.
The power to inscribe such special attributes into certain assets is extremely concen-
trated. According to Pistor, coding takes place behind closed doors, in basically two regions
of the planet – the City of London and Wall Street –, through the hands of elite lawyers – the
‘masters of the code’. Pistor’s depiction of how hermetic and insulated from public over-
sight is the circle of those who code capital certainly generates great anxiety for anyone
interested in finding alternatives to counter this power, but it is no less real. The democratic
promises of modern law are contradictory to its practice under capitalism, yet entangled
with it. To adapt Bruno Latour’s (1993) image to Pistor’s diagnosis, we have never indeed
been modern in how capitalism is legally structured.
The Code of Capital offers a theory of law’s role for global capital. As such, it is
arguably applicable to understand capital’s relation to law globally, in a systemic form. As
Pistor puts it, ‘manifestations of capital and capitalism have changed dramatically, yet
capital’s source code has remained almost unchanged throughout’ (p. 10). The legal
modules of private law are depicted as being pervasive (even if not homogeneous every-
where), and the legal attributes bestowed by them, given their formal character, as poten-
tially universal. At the same time, however, Pistor’s analysis of capital’s legal code stems
from what could be seen as illustrations that are limited in at least two ways.
Historically, several of Pistor’s empirical descriptions emphasize how the legal mod-
ules are put to work in coding capital in ‘small, incremental steps’ (p. 216) in episodes
mostly located in two broad periods. On the one hand, the 19th century, intellectually
hegemonized by classical liberalism and what Duncan Kennedy (2006) has conceptua-
lized as the set of ‘legal institutions and ideas’ that comprise ‘classical legal thought’. On
the other, the second half of the 20th century, what some describe as a new historical period
of capitalism under the dominance of finance (Lapavitsas, 2013) and neo-liberalism
(Slobodian, 2018). The book doesn’t make clear, however, how the timeframe between
these two broad periods fits into the analysis, that is, how to make sense of the coding of
capital during ‘post-war democratic capitalism’ (Streeck, 2014) – the trente glorieuses or
the Golden Age. In terms of legal ideas and institutions, this period can be seen as dom-
inated by a ‘socially oriented legal thought’ that mediated between social and individual
rights, opened itself to alternatives to the market as a mechanism of resource allocation,
and privileged the institutional translation of such economic policy ideals into legal areas
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(or ‘modules’, to use Pistor’s terms) such as administrative law and labor law, rather than
contract or property law (Kennedy, 2006). Such considerable differences, however, did
not imply a complete systemic rupture; to be clear, those were still capitalist societies.
Underplayed in Pistor’s analysis, this period poses some questions to the overall argument
of the book. Wasn’t capital coding taking place properly in that period? Why weren’t the
‘masters of the code’ successful throughout 30 years in the center of capitalism? How
come states – which in Pistor’s analysis have mostly a ‘passive’ role in respect to legal
coding (see Picciotto below) – managed to submit the legal code and its masters to public
control? Should this period be interpreted as one of the suspension of attributes such as the
‘priority’ of capital’s holders over other claims? Or is it better conceived as a limitation to
capital’s aspirations to ‘universality’, given its submission to national polities? Does it
make sense to talk about ‘degrees’ in which the legal attributes conferred to capital can
operate in different contexts and historical moments – less (as in the post-war consensus),
or more pronounced (as in neo-liberalism)?
The relevance of these questions could be countered by the argument that they
simply miss the bigger picture, since the specific articulation of law and capitalism
in the post-war period was exceptional, limited to a time-span of only three decades,
and thus peripheral to the overall narrative. Understanding the roots of capital’s legal
code in classical liberalism and its recombination in contemporary financial capitalism
could be enough to ground a theory about how law creates capital and inequality.
However, it could also be argued that the relevance of these questions may not be
confined to mere historical precision, but lie in their potential to shed light on the reach
of Pistor’s theory of the role of law for capitalism. If the legal attributes and modules
mapped in the book, as well the ‘masters of the code’ are not permanently powerful,
should The Code of Capital be better read as a description of the legal code of capital in
general, or of financial or neoliberal capitalism in particular? In sum, how to reconcile
a general theory of the code of capital with approaches that stress the existence of
‘varieties of capitalism’ (Hall and Soskice, 2001) or different capitalist ‘accumulation
regimes’ (Jessop and Sum, 2006)?
A second dimension in which Pistor’s illustrations can be considered limited is geo-
graphical (with its political and social implications). As Pistor makes explicit, ‘Global
capitalism as we know it comes remarkably close to this theoretical possibility: it is built
around two domestic legal systems, the laws of England and those of New York State,
complemented by a few international treaties, and an extensive network of bilateral trade
and investment regimes, which themselves are centered around a handful of advanced
economies’ (p. 132). The book is very much focused on the global North, on what can be
seen as its financial core – the US and the UK. Other countries of the center such as France
and Germany do appear now and then, but at most as contrasting examples to the former. It
seems that the periphery – or the global South – occupies the uttermost passive role in the
processes of coding capital, as the code seems to come from abroad and impose itself,
dismantling existing relations around certain assets.
One example is presented in chapter 2, in the battles Pistor narrates between the Maya
peoples of Belize and capitalists (backed by the state) around property rights over land,
won by the latter. In chapter 5, Pistor provides what seems to be described as a successful
example from the periphery of contestation of the code of capital. Emerging economies
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appear in struggles over intellectual property rights. Pistor mentions the example of India
that, against the pressures of big pharma to code know-how over drugs, ‘enacted laws
that encouraged the production of cheap drugs for their people while also imposing
restrictions on the scope of private rights’ (p. 122).
As these examples illustrate, it seems that the periphery should be understood in
Pistor’s overall approach through dynamics of colonization and legal imperialism
through legal transplants and the export of law – successful most of the time,
although not always. As she states explicitly, ‘For most people in most countries,
the law that sustains global capitalism is also beyond reach, because these countries
only recognize and enforce laws that were made by others’ (p. 133). Although she
recognizes that in order ‘to be effective’ transplants ‘have to be adapted to local
conditions’ (p. 133), the emphasis of the book is that the general result of adaptation
has been an effective ‘harmonization of laws’ and ‘the recognition and enforcement
of foreign law’ (p. 134). Under these conditions, the legal modules necessary for the
code of capital thrive. If, however, these conditions are not met – a situation that
according to Pistor is to be found in many countries that tend to have ‘weaker legal
institutions’ due to colonization and imperialism – ‘the modules of the code will not
produce lasting wealth effects’ – meaning that ‘private wealth will be guarded by
physical force, stacked in foreign bank accounts, or coded in foreign law with
foreign courts standing by to back it’ (p. 17).
It seems that within Pistor’s analysis of global capitalism the periphery can be thus
understood as oscillating between two possibilities: it is either a successful destination of
transplants that harmonize the legal modules demanded by global capital, or a legal
system that doesn’t offer good prospects for coding capital and is thus circumvented by it
through other jurisdictions. In either case, the creation and accumulation of wealth seems
to demand globally a set of attributes that can be found only in a certain composition of
legal modules provided by private law coded in the North. As with the interpretation of
the trente glorieuses, it is hard to fit into the scheme any variation of capital coding.
When applied to countries from the periphery, this difficulty signals a risk of interpreting
these countries through a ‘legal fiction of failed law’ (Esquirol, 2008), i.e. understanding
that peripheral countries offer corrupt or inefficient institutions and lack the appropriate
ones for a certain outcome – in this case, for capital to thrive.
A possible way out of this conundrum is offered by Pistor herself. The book’s take on
the ‘feudal calculus’ can be seen as a sort of ‘peripheralization’ of the center, as Pistor
founds a dialectic (not a dichotomy) between modern and archaic elements in global
capital coding. A similar epistemological approach could be adopted in the opposite
direction, that is, to look at the periphery and try to detect elements typical of the ‘centre’
within its particular dynamics, that is, features that could be operating functionally for
capital, even if considerably different from institutions in the North in general, and from
the legal modules produced in the US and the UK in particular. Paraphrasing Marx’s
view of colonization, such an approach could serve not only to understand the specifi-
cities of the periphery, but most importantly better to grasp, through the peripheries, the
conditions of capitalism in the center – a truly global perspective on the code of global
capital.1
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The potential of the decoding of capital on its own terms in the periphery can be
illustrated through the issue of the relevance of public law for capital coding. For Pistor,
‘public and private law are intertwined and jointly constitute the system we call capit-
alism’ (p. 209). Nevertheless, public law, the constitutional order and state power in
general are on the backstage, being ‘essential for ensuring that the code’s attributes are
respected and enforced’ (p. 216) – but the attributes themselves come from elsewhere,
the legal modules of private law. In the periphery, however, it could be argued that
frequently public law has performed a much more direct role in coding capital. State and
capital have often been enmeshed, as illustrated by ‘developmentalist’ strategies of
wealth creation and accumulation that can be observed in the history of different coun-
tries, mostly in East Asia and Latin America (Chang, 2002; Chibber, 2003; Evans 1995).
In developmental experiences, often based on the assumption that private capital is
incapable of or undesirable for performing certain productive tasks, the state has been
more than mere ‘custodian’ of the economy, also acting as a ‘demiurge’ (Evans, 1995) –
that is, engaging directly in the production of wealth. State-owned corporations are an
exemplary instrument for that purpose, and hence public law a key provider of the legal
modules necessary to code the corporation. Developmentalism has also been keen for
state promotion of (national) capital, for instance, through tariff protection for certain
sectors against foreign competition, or the taking over of risky economic activities by the
state, notably, in research and development (Evans, 1995) – again instruments that resort
to public law to code capital.
Privatization and liberalization policies of the 1990s greatly impacted the strategies of
developmental states to code capital, but didn’t hinder a new wave of state activism in
emerging economies in the 2000s. As the literature on the emergence of the so-called
‘BRICS’ illustrates, rather than anti-capitalistic ventures, these experiences can be better
defined as attempts of capital creation and accumulation on different grounds if com-
pared to the liberal ‘consensus’ of the previous decade. Once again, it seems that state
and capital were closely imbricated. Not by chance, a new wave of ‘law and develop-
ment’ analysis burgeoned in the period, focusing on documenting the new forms of
articulation between state, law and the economy and pointing to the relevance of ‘new
functionalities’ for law to steer public–private collaboration in wealth creation and
accumulation (Trubek et al., 2012). The combination of private law with public law can
be thus seen as key to the coding of capital. For instance, industrial policy in Brazil in the
first decade of the 2000s resorted to public finance through a state-owned development
bank to foster innovation in the private sector (Trubek et al., 2012). For that to happen,
devices from contract and corporate law were necessary. As the bank is a state-owned
enterprise, structures provided by administrative law were also necessary, as was the
establishment of governance mechanisms to enable coordination and monitoring of the
public–private joint-ventures initiated by the state. Another example of a possible dis-
tinct coding of capital through public power can be found in Pistor’s own description of
the battles around patents for drugs in India. While the limitation of patentability by the
Indian state cannot be described as entirely anti-capitalist (as other corporations certainly
benefited from battles fought in the name of a developing country) it remains antago-
nistic to what can be taken as the quintessential example of the coding of capital in
action, that of enclosing knowledge.
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Recent years seem to indicate yet another swing in the pendulum, as several far-right
regimes that came to power in countries of the South are associated with ultra-liberal
projects to steer peripheral countries toward a convergence with what the legal code of
capital demands. However, it is hard to deny that throughout the history of peripheral
countries state power and public law have been instrumental for coding capital. Even if
most of these attempts failed, China’s consolidation in the world economy may be seen
as an extremely successful trajectory of wealth production and accumulation that cannot
be placed outside the capitalist spectrum, and that at the same time resorts to legal
modules that are not confined to private law to do so. Although barely mentioned in
the book, the rise of China poses an unavoidable challenge to the way capital has been
coded globally by the UK and the US, and raises the question whether public power and
its instrumentalization through public law may really be as secondary as depicted to
understanding capitalism.
These examples appear to suggest that the coding of capital might take place through
legal modules other than those offered by private law, due to the local conditions of
different countries. One way of looking at those experiences is to understand them as a
sort of ‘hacking’ or a ‘bug’ of the code of capital. Another, more promising approach, as
Pistor herself emphasizes in her previous work and advocates in a more recent proposal
for a ‘comparative legal institutionalism’, is to understand that ‘the relation between
institutions and systems is characterized by complex interactions’ and to take into
account ‘the social and political structures in which institutions are embedded’ (Pistor,
2011: 1). In this sense, these experiences from the periphery do not contradict the land-
scape portrayed by Pistor in The Code of Capital, but might add complexity to it,
enabling one to question whether it is possible to abstract capital from social and political
relations. Pistor’s theory of the legal attributes demanded by capital certainly holds in the
periphery, but often with adaptations to local power struggles. Priority, for instance, may
be guaranteed in certain political economy constellations to national capital. Durability
can be ensured for certain assets, as long as it contributes to certain objectives established
by the state, as in industrial policy goals. These local adaptations may explain why
certain forms of coding capital have been constantly under attack by the ‘masters of the
code’ and their propositions for legal reform, as they potentially contradict the interests
of capital holders in the center. Taking into account the diverse forms of coding capital
may also enable the comparison and assessment of alternatives to the hegemony of
private law modules and its harmful contribution in deepening inequality and reprodu-
cing privilege. Given the experiences in the periphery or in the ‘post-war consensus’ in
the center, is it really enough to ‘qualify’ or modulate the legal attributes demanded by
capital through, for instance, ‘better’ regulation or a close entanglement of state and
capital, or is it necessary to consider more seriously that some assets should not be coded
as capital in the first place?
Note
1. In the last chapter of Capital’s volume one – ‘The modern theory of colonisation’, Marx
suggests that ‘It is the great merit of E.G. Wakefield to have discovered, not anything new
about the Colonies, but to have discovered in the Colonies the truth as to the conditions of
capitalist production in the mother country’.
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Capital Without Capitalism? Or
Capitalism Without Determinism?
Anna Chadwick
University of Glasgow, Scotland
‘Of economic conceptions few are more fundamental and none more obscure than
capital’. So opens an 1896 article by the celebrated American economist, Irvine Fisher
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(Fisher, 1896). While most economists and businessmen ‘feel that there is such a thing
as capital’, Fisher notes, and can likewise agree that ‘specified groups for commodities
are capital’, there is remarkable variation in how capital is defined and understood.
Fifteen different definitions of capital authored by 15 economists are listed by Fisher,
including those given by Smith, Riccardo, Mill, Walras, and Jevons (Fisher, 1896:
511–512). Most of these economists can agree that capital is something that produces a
revenue; that it can take the form of money, or of physical goods and infrastructure;
and that it can be both an input and an output of production. Yet, when it comes to
identifying which types of goods and revenues are and are not capital, or, further to
Fisher’s important requalification, at what point in time they are operating as capital,
consensus is elusive. The debate continues today. Thomas Picketty’s landmark book,
Capital in the 21st Century, purports to explain contemporary patterns of inequality by
identifying a ‘law’ of capitalism pursuant to which the return on capital consistently
outpaces the average growth of the economy as a whole (Picketty, 2014). In other
words, ‘[C]apital reproduces itself faster than output increases’ (Picketty, 2014: 571).
The book has been widely acclaimed, nonetheless, Picketty has come under fire from
other leading economists for ‘equating wealth with capital’ (Stiglitz, 2015) and for
failing to recognize human capital as capital (Homburg, 2015). Can a legal scholar
shed any new light on this centuries old debate?
In her bold and original new book, The Code of Capital: How the Law Creates
Wealth and Inequality, Katharina Pistor offers a novel approach to understanding the
nature of capital. Her primary goal is not to define capital so as to enable some kind of
binary coding of assets – ‘capital’ / ‘not capital’ – albeit that her analysis could be used
in this vein; rather, her purpose is to demonstrate that ‘with the right legal coding’ any
asset can be turned into capital, and can thereby ‘increase its propensity to create
wealth for its holders’ (p. 2). Capital, she asserts, is made up of two ingredients: the
asset and the legal code. Assets can be anything from land and property to ideas and
promises. What matters is that when they are coded in law these assets are furnished
with a set of attributes that can be used to create new wealth, as well as to protect old
wealth. The legal code is made up of a variety of different legal modules, including, but
not limited to, contract law, property rights, collateral law, and trust, corporate, and
bankruptcy laws. This ‘mostly private’ legal code has been deployed for hundreds of
years by creative legal agents to a changing roster of assets, including land, firms, debt,
and certain kinds of knowledge (pp. 2–3). Capital, Pistor underlines, is not a physical
thing that inheres in certain goods, nor is it ‘just one set of antagonistic social relations
as between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie’ (p. 10). Instead, capital is made via a
decentralized process in which lawyers manipulate a set of ‘private’ legal modules that
enjoy the backing of the State, and graft them onto new assets for their benefit of their
clientele. Importantly, The Code of Capital is concerned to demonstrate that the incre-
mental, publically sanctioned but privately driven process of creating capital has
significant political consequences: this legal process allows the holders of capital to
rule the global economy (p. 22).
Very unusually in discussions of what capital is and how capitalism works, the book
puts the spotlight on the ordinary lawyers who build on the basic code of the law and
embellish it to create new regimes of right and entitlement through which capital
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owners can ‘control the levers for the distribution of wealth in society’ (p. 19). In 2014,
David Grewal Singh suggested that in order to understand Picketty’s ‘law of capital-
ism’ – ‘why r > g has generally held’ – greater attention needed to be paid to the ‘laws
of capitalism’, in other words, to ‘how the legal foundations of capitalism influence the
rate of return on capital and its consistent outpacing of overall growth’ (Grewal Singh,
2016: 652–653). Pistor takes on this challenge. She develops a new vocabulary to
explain how lawyers work to confer wealth-generating attributes on assets, and she
identifies the particular legal mechanisms through which assets can generate a mon-
etary return over time. Through the application of legal ‘modules’, holders of particular
assets are able to claim priority and rank their claims to particular assets above com-
peting claims; legal coding can also create durability, expanding the lifespan of par-
ticular assets, or insulating them from creditors; the third attribute Is universality,
which extends the effect of a legal arrangement beyond the immediate parties and
enables it to be upheld erga omnes; finally, legal coding ensures that capital assets are
convertible and can be redeemed for state money, which ensures that the holders of the
assets can lock in gains even in conditions of crisis (pp. 13–15). This dimension of
Pistor’s work is reminiscent of the work of other legal theorists who have created
typologies of different legal rights and their relations. There is something Hohfeldian
in the effort to specify the precise nature of the powers that certain legal rights and
regimes grant to some actors, and how they correspondingly disempower and disinherit
others (Hohfeld, 1913). Albeit that Pistor does not explicitly specify the ‘correlative’
effect of each of the legal powers that she identifies, the text is replete with examples
from history, as well as from contemporary financial markets, that highlight the legal
experiences of the ‘have nots’ – those on the other side of these newly-minted capital
‘coins’.
The book’s contribution in terms of making visible the legal relations through
which wealth is created and protected not only helps to resolve some of the enigmas
of capital, it also sheds light on one of the central paradoxes of the liberal legal
system(s): Certain kinds of legal rights, notably human rights and constitutional
rights, are typically held to be inalienable, fundamental, and paramount – formally,
they are equal, if not superior to, other kinds of legal rights and claims. Out there in
the world, however, human rights are routinely violated and ignored with impunity,
and when people seeking effective protection for their constitutional and human
rights do have their day in court, they often find that their ‘fundamental’ and
‘inalienable’ rights are not weighty enough to be prioritized over other private
claims over land or resources, nor are they universally effective against all those
who would seek to breach them, and neither do they convert into a direct claim on
the State’s revenues. One influential take on the fictions of the liberal legal system
is that ‘between equal rights, force decides’ (Marx, 1975: 234–235). Another ger-
mane explanation advanced in the field of International Law suggests that the
meaning of legal rights and principles is fundamentally indeterminate, which means
that skillful advocates and judges can effectively argue their content into being, and
in directions that suit the needs of those powers that they are representing (Kosken-
niemi, 2009). By elaborating the concept of legal coding, The Code of Capital points
to a further possibility: perhaps these purportedly equal legal rights were never
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formally equal in the first place because their legal coding is different? Pistor’s
analysis, like that of Hohfeld, implies that the rights created under different legal
regimes carry different legal weights, and that many of the purportedly ‘fundamen-
tal’ rights created in public law may correspond to a weaker constellation of powers
and privileges than those created under private law. Contrary to the direction in
which many critics of Liberal legalism have tended to argue, this would suggest that
economic inequalities are not only the function of insistence upon the juridical
equality of persons before the law in conditions of material inequality; they are
also the function of the pre-existing juridical inequalities between different legal
rights and regimes.
The very active and powerful role for law in The Code of Capital counters popular
presentations of how law relates to economic globalization, financial crises, and
inequality. The dominant account of the 2008 global financial crisis remains one in
which law and regulation enter only after the fact, as a means of response to the crisis.
Undoubtedly this portrayal is unconvincing to many legal scholars, bankers, and insti-
tutionalist economists, but the story in the media and in policy circles has been one of
the removal of capital controls; the dismantling of protections separating investment
banking and retail banking; and the deregulation of financial institutions, which have
been let loose to realize a vision of ‘self-regulating’ markets. This book is a powerful
counter-narrative to such influential representations of how finance has come to dom-
inate the global economy. It shows that financial ‘liberalisation’ has been the product
of intense legal work in which certain kinds of assets have been legally empowered to
cross borders, and to dodge creditors and regulators. Pistor’s work contributes to a
project that Annalise Riles has advanced in her work on financial collateral, which
illuminates how the mundane and routine work of legal professionals who ‘paper the
deals’ is integral to the operation of financial markets (Riles, 2011). Both accounts
regard the role of lawyers and the standard-form contracts that they complete for their
clients as fundamental to the existence of global financial markets. However, Riles’s
description of the work of lawyers as ‘routine’ and ‘mundane’ contrasts with the
presentation of Pistor, who emphasizes the creativity and inventiveness of lawyers
who have ‘pieced together different portions of legal rules that were adopted in dif-
ferent eras’ in order to create the legal infrastructure of the global derivatives market
(p. 154).
The book’s focus on ‘backroom’ lawyers and solicitors disrupts other accounts of
how the holders of capital have come to dominate the global economy, and with what
all of this has to do with law. In recent years, critical scholars writing about neoliber-
alism have suggested that economic globalization and a coeval trend of rising inequal-
ity has come about through the progressive harmonization of laws and legal regimes.
International financial institutions have been charged with spearheading initiatives
designed to format the domestic legal systems of many countries in the Global South
to serve the interests of foreign capital through the promotion of ‘rule of law’ initia-
tives, and via bilateral investment treaties (Humphreys, 2010; Schneiderman, 2008). In
another influential contribution, Quinn Slobodian foregrounds the efforts of ‘Geneva
School’ neoliberals in lobbying for the creation of a ‘global economic constitution’ that
privileges the private rights and economic freedoms needed to underpin markets
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(dominium rights) over the ‘imperium right’ of sovereign states to control economic
activity within its territory (Slobodian, 2018). In her discussion of economic globali-
zation and the rise of finance, Pistor protests that harmonization is both slow and, in
many instances, unnecessary: recognition regimes in international private law enable
the holders of capital to pick and choose between legal regimes, and to select those that
best suit their interests. The dominant legal project is not one of encoding and enfor-
cing a global economic constitution; it is a project of jurisdictional arbitrage – of
exploiting differences between a patchwork of different legal systems. What are
needed are conflict of laws provisions that ‘endorse the choices that private parties
make’ (p. 135).
The Code of Capital is also in dialogue with scholarship on ‘transnational’ private
law. Contra scholarship that has suggested that private financial actors are engaged
in making a ‘global law beyond the state’, Pistor argues that no ‘global law’ or
‘global state’ is needed to enable the operations of global financial markets because
state-sanctioned private law already enables global transactions to be legally pro-
tected in multiple jurisdictions. In theory, a single legal system could be capable of
sustaining global capitalism. Indeed, as Pistor contends, ‘global capitalism as we
know it comes remarkably close to this theoretical possibility’: it is built around two
domestic legal systems the Common Law legal systems of New York and the laws
of England, and complemented by a few international treaties and an extensive
network of bilateral trade and investment regimes (p. 132). The analysis of the legal
construction of the derivatives markets flows into an engagement with some of the
questions that have also preoccupied contributors to the ‘Legal Origins’ literature –
a body of work that studies why it is that common law jurisdictions appear to have
an advantage over civil law jurisdictions in terms of economic development and the
growth of financial markets (La Porta et al., 2008). Part of the answer, for Pistor,
lies in the historical development of the legal professions in common versus civil
law countries. In common law jurisdictions, private lawyers have enjoyed both
greater independence from the state, and more creative control over the development
of the law, which, unlike in civil law countries with legal codes, is subject to only to
‘occasional vetting by a court’ (p. 173). A significant qualification is made to the
nature of law-making processes here. Both the American Legal Realists and the
Critical Legal Studies movement challenged legal formalist approaches that under-
stand the law as a science of judicial reasoning, and they demonstrated that judges
effectively make the law. The Code of Capital adds ordinary solicitors into the
picture, and it shows that they too ‘take advantage of law’s indeterminacy’
(p. 217) to effectively make new laws and mint new assets with the tacit permission
of the State. In doing so, the book inserts a chapter that many other critical accounts
of law-making have missed, or have at least only footnoted.
The Code of Capital offers a substantial set of provocations to other influential
conceptions of what capital is and how it is created. To take one important example,
Pistor argues that not only can human beings be coded as capital, but that they can
code themselves as capital. On page 11 she gives the example of a freelancer who
discovers that she can capitalize on her own labor by establishing a corporate entity,
contributing her services in kind, and taking out dividends as the corporation’s
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shareholder in lieu of a salary. Pistor’s account presents a markedly different take on
the nature of capitalist social relations to that of Marx, for whom participation in
capitalist production processes for the laborer involves being subjugated to a system
which they have to destroy in order to subvert. As Marx writes, ‘the means of
production and subsistence . . . become capital only under circumstances in which
they serve at the same time as means of exploitation and subjection of the labourer’
(Marx, 1887: 792). It has already been noted that now that many people effectively
hold equity in capital assets via pension funds and investment schemes, ‘the old
distinction between ‘capitalists’ and “workers”’ has been breached (Stigliz, 2015:
58). Here, however, workers acquire a radical new agency: they can convert them-
selves into capitalists in a few shrewd legal moves. The identification of new
possibilities for agency and strategies for systemic change appear to be an under-
lying concern of the book. Pistor’s analysis builds on her earlier work in Legal
Institutionalism – a school of thought that extends the insights of Institutional
Economics to focus attention on the ‘constitutive role of law’ in capitalist economic
relations (Deakin et al., 2017). The legal system, which in Marxist analysis is
sometimes dismissed as a superstructure that has little potential to shift the under-
lying dynamics of capitalism, is recast as a foundational infrastructure that, if
modified, could perhaps alter the trajectory of global capitalism.
The Code of Capital does not claim to conclusively resolve the centuries old debate
about what differentiates ordinary money and assets from capital. The focus is more
on explicating the process by which capital is made. Capital is understood broadly as
an asset – tangible or intangible – that produces wealth for its holder; it is ‘not a
physical thing, it is a quality’, and one that is legally bestowed. Nevertheless, Pistor
insists that economists must move away from limiting the definition of capital to
physical things that you can see and touch, and she critiques the recent characteriza-
tion of two economists, Haskel and Westlake, who describe the capture of profit by
corporations who deploy intangible assets (copyrights, patents, and trademarks) as
Capitalism without Capital (Haskell and Westlake, 2018). She is convincing in her
argument that economists and accountants have ‘clung’ to the (false) notion that
capital is a physical input, one of the two factors of production, when in fact,
capital . . . is never just about output and input, but always about the ability to capture
and monetize expected returns’ (p. 116). Her book is also a testament to the fact that
Marxists have tended to drastically underweight the role of law in the process of
wealth creation (p. 116). Nonetheless, it is possible that the balance of the argumenta-
tion perhaps tilts too far in another direction. At times, the impression is created that it
is possible to have capital without capitalism. None of the chapters of the book
engages explicitly with how capital is used in, or relates to, more traditional forms
of economic production, such as agriculture or manufacturing. Are these basic eco-
nomic processes that create the means of subsistence not also part of the story of how
wealth is generated and how assets are made capable of generating a return? In order
for any asset – tangible or intangible – to have an economic value, a particular social
world needs to exist in which people pay for things with money instead of producing
them themselves; and in which it is believed to be necessary to own things and to
make investments. Surely the ability of any ‘capital’ asset to have a value, or to
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generate wealth in the future, also depends on the existence of a capitalist economic
system predicated on the generalization of commodity production and exchange; the
development of a universal equivalent in the form of money; the division of labor in
society; and the establishment of a world market? By virtue of the fact that the
broader economic and social processes that constitute capitalism and its markets are
not discussed in the book, it is unclear whether they are seen by the author to be
necessary to the creation of capital or not. Another issue is that although the definition
of capital is drawn expansively, the ‘code of capital’ is not extended to encompass the
legal status and coding of labor. However, if everyone were to be legally entitled to
the product of all of their own labor, would capital exist? Moreover, as the insights of
New Institutional Economics suggest, if it were not possible to direct production by
fiat via an employment contract instead of going to the market for every single
transaction, the transaction costs involved in ordinary manufacturing and production
might also prohibit the formation and accumulation of capital.
Of course, nowhere does the book claim that capital and capitalism are separable.
On the contrary, repeated references are made to capitalism throughout the book.
Nonetheless, the elision of the debate about the relationship between capital, labor,
and wider economic production does create some issues for the argument. Another
question that the analysis in the book throws up is whether the legal coding of
capital is always the same thing as the creation of capital. To return to the debate
rehearsed by Fisher, the analysis in The Code of Capital glides over the efforts of
generations of economists to understand when ordinary money or goods act as
capital and when they do not. Fisher highlights the difficulties inhering in the
attempt to identify and distinguish capital based on Adam Smith’s specification that
capital should produce a revenue as follows: It is agreed that ‘A merchant ship is
capital and a private yacht is not. But what shall we say of an excursion steamer
which carries freight as well?’ (Fisher, 1896: 513). Fisher labors to demonstrate that
attempting to delineate capital from other forms of wealth via the terms ‘productive’
and ‘profitable’ soon ceases ‘to convey a real limitation, for all wealth is productive
of some sort of good’ (Fisher, 1896: 513). Fisher’s argument is that the question of
what is and what is not capital cannot be answered by trying to distinguish between
different kinds of wealth, but should instead be based on the function that a money
or commodities are playing at a given point in time: ‘Food in the pantry at any
instant is capital, the monthly flow of food through the pantry is income. Machinery
existing is capital, its annual replacement or increase is income’ (Fisher, 1896: 514).
‘Just as the ancients regarded solids, liquids and gases as different kinds of matter
(earth, water, air) instead of different states’, he emphasizes, ‘so economists have
thought of capital and income as different kinds of commodities, instead of different
aspects of commodity in time’ (Fisher, 1896: 516). In his own way, Fisher is
interested in trying to ‘code’ capital definitely in order for it to be able to function
as a variable in mathematical calculation. In doing so, he is vulnerable to the same
critique that Marx made of his Classical predecessors, which is that his account of
what capital is overlooks the social relations that make the accumulation of any
‘stock’ of capital at any point in time possible in the first place. Pistor’s analysis
also appears to encounter some difficulties in this regard. To be sure, the analysis in
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The Code of Capital does much to dislodge economists’ predilection for clinging to
ideas of capital as an input to production. Indeed, the concept of coding seems to fit
awkwardly with some forms of physical capital, say factory machinery, for example.
Has factory machinery been assigned all of the legal attributes of priority, durability,
universality, convertibility? Is this how it captures and monetizes expected returns?
Or is it not capital according to the metrics laid out in the book? In its ambiguous
treatment of some types of physical assets, it becomes clearer that it is mainly
intangibles and financial assets that are being designated as capital in The Code
of Capital – assets that do not have to pass through the circuit of commodity
production in order to generate a revenue (M-M, not M-C-M, to use Marx’s for-
mulation). Indeed, based on the case studies in the book, it seems that only ‘ficti-
tious commodities’ (land, labor, money, intellectual property) or financial assets
(bonds, shares, derivatives) have the quality of capital under this optic. If this
reading of the book is in fact correct, it would be interesting to hear more from
the author as to how the legal code maps on to infrastructure, or machinery, or,
alternatively, why these assets should not be considered as capital. Shifting away
from a fixation on capital as a physical thing is usually made by those seeking to
underline that capital is a social relation, but this does not appear to be Pistor’s
project either. Unlike Fisher, both for Pistor, Smith, and other classical economists,
a distinguishing feature of capital is that it generates wealth – it produces revenue.
But does the legal coding alone give assets their wealth-generating capacities? Or,
as already intimated above, is it only and inescapably possible for any asset –
tangible or intangible – to produce a revenue that can be accumulated because it
exists within a legally-constituted market system of functionally differentiated labor
that leads to the creation of demand and the possibility to profit from it? In other
words, is the process of legally coding capital everywhere and always coterminous
with creating capital? For Marx, the Classical economists got it wrong when they
conceptualized capital as a thing, perhaps as a machine, or even a sum of money,
rather than a relationship between people. The Code of Capital puts the spotlight on
the relationship between an asset and its legal code. Narrating this relationship
would certainly seem to tell us a lot about how financial assets are created, and
about how wealth can be protected over time, and about how the owners of capital
can ‘rule by law’, but can it tell us the whole story about what capital is and how it
is produced?
The Code of Capital overturns the influential narrative of economics that the cre-
ation of capital will lead to economic growth, which will mean that wealth will,
eventually, trickle down. What follows from the creation of capital is that wealth is
being created, protected, and actively funneled up. With its pioneering inter-
disciplinary and intra-legal method, the book is a promising pedagogical tool. It can
be put to use to ensure that future generations of private lawyers are much more
conscious of the public consequences of their actions, as well as to educate more
public lawyers about why their constitutional and regulatory ambitions may be habi-
tually thwarted by developments in private law. Although some private lawyers are
doubtless well aware that they are trying to protect wealth and avert tax for individual
clients, not all of them will be fully cognisant of the fact that they are part of a
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profession that has been coding capital for hundreds of years – part of a global
network that is, in many respects, responsible for helping to produce and entrench
economic inequality. To borrow from Michel Foucault, ‘People know what they do;
frequently they know why they do what they do; but what they don’t know is what
what they do does’ (Foucault, quoted in Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 187). The Code
of Capital creates new possibilities for raising social consciousness and for generating
new ideas for how to disrupt processes whereby the few are enriched at the expense of
the many. Some Marxist perspectives on capitalism can produce a fatalistic sense that
– short of an armed revolution – there is not much that can be done to improve the
socio-economic status quo other than to wait for the machinations of the system to
unfold. The presentation of the legal code of capital as being ‘modular’ and modifi-
able creates interesting possibilities. Can social assets be created and coded in the
same way as private capital? Could private lawyers put these legal modules to work
for marginalized groups if paid to do so by government or by NGOs? Would it be
possible to fashion an Entail that could operate to protect the rights of indigenous
communities over certain lands and resources? Or might it be that private lawyers are
only able to only code forms of capital that flow with, rather than against, logics of
exclusion, dispossession, profit and growth? Could it be that once certain legal coor-
dinates – or modules – are put in place, over time, they format economic and social
relations in a particular way, overwriting and excluding other ways of acting and
being? The Code of Capital is likely to inspire responses in both registers. It will
certainly engender an important debate.
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Following the financial crisis it became acceptable, even fashionable, to discuss capit-
alism in critical terms. The evident failures of regulation that triggered the crisis also
brought into the debates the role of law, or more widely regulation. Katharina Pistor’s
book, written from the key vantage point of Columbia Law School, makes a mighty
contribution. Although the book has a wide scope, it seems evident that the main pre-
occupation is with how the financial system was subverted to the point of collapse by the
construction of Ponzi financial pyramids founded on contracts so complex that few could
fathom their wider effects.
In this account, it is private law that takes center stage, as moulded and turbo-charged
by the ‘masters of the legal code’, lawyers acting for the wealthy. The central theme is
that it is the basic modules of the legal code, mainly contract, property, collateral, trusts,
corporations, and bankruptcy law, that bestow on assets the critical attributes that enable
them to create wealth: priority, durability, convertibility and universality (p. 13). This
builds on the basic point made by economic lawyers and institutional economists that
markets depend on legal institutions, to emphasize also that ‘the legal coding accounts
for the value of assets, and thus for the creation of wealth and its distribution’ (p. 19). The
focus is on the power of private law, while stressing that it also requires backing from
‘the coercive powers of a state’ (p. 4). However, the increasing willingness of states to
recognize and enforce each other’s laws has facilitated the construction of a global code,
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based mainly on the common law of England and the laws of New York state, reinforced
by international agreements especially investment protection treaties.
The bulk of the book is devoted to analysis of many episodes and key examples of the
codifications and recodifications that have both generated wealth, or capital, and pro-
tected its accumulation. The analysis of that most physical of assets, land, shows how it
was through battles over rights and their codification that the more powerful interests
acquired and preserved control over this valuable asset, from the enclosures and entails
of post-feudal Britain to the dispossession of first peoples by colonial settlers in Belize,
New Zealand and the USA. The development of the modern corporate form is seen as
enabling access to low-cost finance through asset partitioning and structuring chains of
corporate vehicles. Financial instruments are shown to have been transformed from their
origins in bills of exchange to the residential mortgage-backed securities and collater-
alized debt obligations that combined trusts and contracts into the ‘quintessential legal
steroid’ (p. 87) which wreaked havoc in 2007–2008. Both the intellectual ‘commons’ of
scientific investigation, and now information about the patterns of social life coded as
data, have been targets for appropriation through the expansion of the legal coding of
patents and trade secrets.
The analysis is particularly sophisticated, compared to more conventional institution-
alist accounts, by the recognition that the work of codification exploits the inherent
malleability of law. The ‘inherent incompleteness’ not only of contracts but of all law
‘makes for fertile ground for legal creativity and imagination in every possible direction’
(p. 210). Realist and critical legal scholars are referred to in debunking the notion of
‘clear property rights’, since legal reasoning is ‘open-ended’ and involves multiple
sources of law, so that the fashioning of property rights is ‘a complex process pregnant
with value judgments and power’ (p. 28). The importance of the malleability of law
comes to the fore when exploring the efforts to replace law with digital code, which
would truly hardwire commitments and obligations, precipitating undesirable outcomes
(ch. 8). The necessary flexibility of real-world contracting was shown when the obliga-
tion in derivative contracts to post collateral based on market prices became inoperable
in 2007 as markets froze, so counterparties resorted to ‘offline’ ad hoc negotiation, which
it is suggested softened the advent of the crisis (p. 191). Blockchain-based contracts lack
the flexibility to respond to either exogenous uncertainty, or indeed their own endogen-
ous flaws.
Pistor aligns with the argument of Christoph Menke (2015) that the capitalist or
liberal legal order is founded on a fundamental clash between the primacy of the pro-
tection of private rights and the use of law to advance social goals (p. 217). In the final
chapter, she outlines two radical solutions that have been put forward to resolve the crisis
of capitalist legal liberalism: the ‘radical markets’ proposal of Posner and Weyl (2018) to
replace property rights with contingent use rights; and Menke’s proposal to re-found a
rights-based system based on relative or reflexive rights, determined through an open
political process. Pointing out that both would entail considerable coercion, she puts
forward a more pragmatic program for eight key reforms, ranging from the denial of
special legal privileges or exemptions, and restrictions on the choice of law in contracts,
to reining in the legal ‘masters of the code’ by rethinking the funding of law schools and
pay structures in large law firms. While conceding that such gradualism may serve only
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to make capitalism more sustainable, the hope is that persistent incrementalism may be a
viable push-back strategy.
Like all analyses that depart from private rights and markets, Pistor’s thesis constantly
runs into the problem of the specification of property rights. These ineluctably require
the active exercise of state power, not simply to enforce private agreements. Since
Coase’s ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) institutionalists, while conceding that the
‘initial specification of property rights’ is key to determining where costs fall, treat it as
exogenous. This ‘genesis question’ underlies the view that ‘asset holders’ (capitalists)
benefit from ‘a first mover advantage enshrined in procedural law that governs the
enforcement of private claims’ (p. 210). In other words, possession is nine-tenths of the
law. For Pistor, the key elements that turn assets into wealth-creating capital are ‘exemp-
tions’ from general law founded on equal rights, or Weber’s ‘modern particularism’
(p. 206).
The genesis of property is discussed particularly in the context of proposals for digital
contracting, pointing out that ‘[c]reating property rights from scratch is, of course, a
difficult task’ (p. 193). Above all, it depends directly on state coercive power. This lies
behind her rejection of both the proposals for ‘radical markets’ and rights-based refound-
ing, since both entail a fundamental rebalancing of the ‘specific relation between private
and public power, private code and public law’ (p. 218). Pistor points out that this occurs
not only in revolutionary moments, but as a continuous process of struggle. Her analyses
show that much of this is done through adjustments of rights of ‘priority’, a cogent
concept which helps to analyze the relativity of property rights, and the interactions of
property and contract.
However, I suggest that an adjustment of the perspective to focus more clearly on
the public and private and their interactions would produce a different picture,
perhaps a more convincing portrayal of the changing nature of capitalism itself,
and not only ‘assets’ coded as capital. The separation of the public and private is
indeed central to capitalism, as a system in which economic activity appears in the
form of relationships of private exchange, while the public sphere of politics and
state power consists of interactions between citizens. From that perspective, only
contract law can truly be considered private, governing exchange transactions. Prop-
erty rights always necessitate a prior intervention into the apparently private sphere
of exchange by the state. Thus, it is the definition of property rights by state action
that sets the conditions for the economic activities that take the form of exchange
between equal transacting parties.
Far from being confined to coding private law, the power of lawyers stems from their
role in mediating these public–private intersections. Although part of Pistor’s picture,
this is at its periphery. The interactions of international and domestic law primarily
concern the choice of law. State legislation results from ‘lobbying’, usually to grant
privileges or exemptions. Indeed there is more discussion of the important role of
‘private legislation’, such as the standard form contracts of the ISDA (International
Swaps and Derivatives Association). It is surely lawyers who write state legislation as
much as contracts, but the state and its agents are seen as generally playing a passive role.
It is pointed out that the state does not always side with capital, and that there have been
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enactments of social protections and labour rights, but these are seen as defensive
attempts to ‘rebalance the playing field’ (p. 217).
The private law perspective is particularly lopsided in explaining the corporation. To
be sure, privileged access to finance, resulting from the exploitation of the powerful
combination of legal personality and limited liability, played a key part in the rise of
large corporations, and was central to the financial crisis and its aftermath of state
rescues of financial institutions. However, the corporate form is better viewed as ‘socia-
lized capital’ (Roy, 1997), enabling an institution insulated from the market able to plan
large-scale economic activities by exploiting the social power of labor. This was recog-
nized by theorists as apparently divergent as Karl Marx and Ronald Coase,1 although
largely overlooked by most of the latter-day followers of both. Certainly, it has been
lawyers who have moulded the contours of the corporate form, and ensured its coding in
terms of private property rights. But viewing it purely from the optic of private law
surely fails to capture the essence of the framework it has provided for contemporary
corporate capitalism.
There is also little mention in the book of the enormous growth of the public law of
economic regulation, to the point that many describe as the creation of a ‘regulatory
state’. Admittedly, much of this is ‘hyper-regulation’, resulting from the inappropriate
specification of initial property rights, and so creates a legal battleground over the
balance of private rights and public priorities, generally dominated by corporate power
(Picciotto, 2017: 693). The point, however, is that we need a more realistic picture of
capitalism than can be provided only from private law and idealized markets. Contem-
porary capitalism is dominated by giant corporations operating in symbiosis with a
plethora of quasi-governmental bodies in private–public ‘partnerships’. For all its fail-
ings, regulatory law attempts to frame networks of social relationships that are both far
denser and more extensive than could be managed by a purely private law system of
individual rights.
In fact, for all its private law perspective, the book has surprisingly little to say about
contract law, despite the long-standing debates over the ‘death of contract’. One of
Pistor’s eight prescriptions is for the resurrection of ‘age-old limitations on coding
capital that have been dismantled over time’, instancing the unenforceability of wagering
contracts (p. 227), which could have prevented the expansion of speculative financial
derivatives. But the solution proposed involves regulation: a burden of proof on their
users, which surely entails consideration of the optimal mix of public and private (Camp-
bell and Picciotto, 2000). There is clearly much more to be said about the implications of
the enormous extension of contractualism into administrative fields, and the attempts to
rethink ‘regulatory contracts’ in terms of public law (Campbell, 2007; Collins, 1999;
Freeman, 2003; Vincent-Jones, 2006). Indeed, the impact of the growth of purposeful
‘regulation’ on the voluntarist private-law perspectives that govern many areas of law
needs wider exploration (Parker et al., 2004).
Examples could also be explored of battles over coding that seem to have succeeded
in preserving space for egalitarian and non-exploitative interactions. One such is the
‘copyleft’ movement, that generated a technical-legal ecosystem of intellectual prop-
erty licensing standards (Picciotto, 2011: 433–436). The ‘coding’ of the GPL (General
Public Licence) and the ‘creative commons’ licences combines property rights and
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contracts as ingeniously as any, but to act as a barrier against private appropriation, not
as wealth-generating ‘capital’. Of course, these barriers are not impermeable, and
Google and other giants have shown that enormous profits can be derived from the
indirect exploitation of labor that takes place in the ‘commons’. The point, however,
would be to consider why and especially how these systems of peer-to-peer networked
production preferred these coding models, and how they developed and became
institutionalized.
Certainly, a key role is played by the lawyers who act as ‘creative ideologists’
operating between the state and the market (Dezalay, 1996). Pistor ascribes the key
role to the true ‘masters of the code’, such as Marty Lipton credited with devising the
‘poison pill’ protection against hostile takeovers, rather than the battalions of never-
theless highly paid lawyers engaged in complex but ‘plain vanilla’ transactions (p.
163). However, innovative coding requires suitably fertile ground to take root and
resource-intensive maintenance to flourish. Pistor points out that the economically
powerful can hire the best lawyers, but this does not necessarily mean the most capable
or ingenious, but those with sufficient authority to provide legitimation for profitable
activities. She hesitates to go so far as to accept that law is ‘but a disguise for the
exercise of naked power’ (p. 28), but the book includes many examples showing how
economic power can mould law.
A striking case has been the patentability of genetic sequences, which has been
an area of considerable legal uncertainty, not least because it arose in a field of
largely publicly funded basic science. Under pressure from business to grant patents
and stimulate a biotechnology industry, the patent offices of the EU, Japan and the
US attempted to agree technical standards, and began to grant patents, with different
degrees of caution. As legal challenges emerged, some patents were invalidated by
the courts, and Pistor relates the notable case of Myriad Genetics, which lost pro-
tection for its claim to the breast cancer gene sequence in the US Supreme Court
(pp. 112–114). Nevertheless, as Pistor relates, Myriad generated billions in profits
from selling testing kits, while operating in this legal miasma. This is part of a wider
story, as the volatility in corporate valuations due to these legal and other uncer-
tainties led to corporate concentrations, as well as pressures for various public
initiatives, including collective and compulsory licensing and patent pooling (Pic-
ciotto, 2011: 401–404).
Thus, political and economic power battles also involve debates and conflicts over the
legal codes that shape social and economic relations. The inherent indeterminacy of law
creates arenas for these battles, providing the ‘first mover’ advantage that Pistor
describes, as capital can exploit legal uncertainty. Indeed, lawyers are in their element
in legal gray areas, as they battle for what Pierre Bourdieu has called ‘le droit de dire le
droit’ (the right to state the law), to justify their interpretation as the ‘correct’ one, and
thereby sanctify its representation of the world with ‘the perceived objectivity of ortho-
doxy’ (Bourdieu, 1987: 839).
This involves a much more complex social process than just the invention of inge-
nious legal coding. The stabilization of normative expectations also requires domination
of the cognitive community that establishes the shared understandings enabling the
normalization of favored interpretations of the law. Access to legal resources gives
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powerful advantages to ensure domination of this process of normalization through
professional techniques and practices. Hence, power in today’s corporate capitalism is
buttressed by the ability to mobilize lawyers in large numbers, to dominate professional
discourses, and deploy complex strategies, moving between the public sphere of politics
and the state and the private sphere of structuring and managing commercial and cor-
porate transactions. Pistor’s book shines a bright spotlight particularly on the techniques
and devices for coding these transactions.
Note
1. Marx captured the contradictory nature of what in his day was the joint-stock company, by
describing it as representing ‘the abolition of capitalist private industry on the basis of the
capitalist private system itself’, and involving ‘the control of social capital’ in which ‘social
means of production appear as private property’ so that ‘instead of overcoming the antithesis
between the character of wealth as social and as private wealth, the stock companies merely
develop it in a new form’ (Capital vol. 3, chapter 27, text available at www.marxists.org).
Coase’s seminal article ‘The Nature of the Firm’ (1937) saw the firm as a system of planned
coordination (building on Adam Smith); analyzing the production factors which it would be
more efficient to coordinate rather than to buy contractually, he argued that this is most likely to
be so when the content of a contract is hard to specify in advance. In finding that this is
especially so for labor, due to the power to direct labor in the employment relation, he clearly
echoed Marx.
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Coding Capital: On the Power and Limits
of (Private) Law: A Rejoinder
Katharina Pistor
Columbia Law School, USA
I would like to thank Emilios Christodoulidis for putting together this ‘dialogue and
debate’ for the journal Social & Legal Studies that discusses my recent book ‘The Code
of Capital: How the Law Creates Wealth and Inequality’ (2019). Like other authors,
academics write books in the hope that they will be read; but more than this, they write
books in the hope that others will engage with their arguments. I am thus deeply grateful
to the four authors who have contributed to this volume. For my response, I have picked
several related themes that I distilled from their critiques: the limits of private law; the
limits of a Western legal perspective; and the limits of law. For readers who have not
read the book, I offer a brief summary of its core themes before turning to these themes.
The Code of Capital in a Nutshell
Capital, I argue in my book, is not a thing. It is the capacity of assets to generate wealth
for their holders and protect it over time. They owe this capacity to a social good, namely
law, a social construct that organizes how the states means of coercion can be accessed
and employed. The qualities that bestow simply objects, promises or ideas with wealth
generating and protecting powers are priority, durability, convertibility and universality.
Priority ranks rights; it creates stronger over weaker ones. Durability extends rights in
time, thereby giving the underlying assets a chance to grow and multiply. Convertibility
locks in past gains by allowing asset holders to convert their assets into safer ones that
are more likely to maintain their value; this is how financial assets attain durability.
Universality, finally, extends all these interests in space by protecting them against
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others or the world (erga omnes), whether or not they were part of the original agreement
or knew about it.
Importantly, these qualities describe rights to an object, a promise or an idea, rights
that are distinct from the asset itself. This is easier to grasp when talking about intan-
gibles that exist only in law, such as a patent or a securitized asset for example. The legal
rights are the asset. For physical assets, such as land or machines, you need to abstract
from the thing itself and recognize the legal coding that is critical for extracting its
economic value.1 Land has certain use value without any legal coding: to graze sheep
or grow crops, for example. Only the proper legal coding, however, gives the land’s
owner the right to enjoy its use, and – and this is critical for capital – to capture its current
or expected monetary value by selling, leasing, or mortgaging it (Commons, 1924: 16).
Oftentimes landowners both consume and benefit from the land’s earning powers; for
capital the latter is key. Thomas Piketty has shown that by the end of the 19th century,
land was still the most important source of wealth in the UK and elsewhere, yet few
English landlords actually lived on their land and even fewer tilled it themselves
(Piketty, 2014). They had rented or mortgaged it, while using legal techniques like the
entail to protect the family’s interests in its future use and return value (Anderson, 2010).
The same is true for machines. Capital is not about the thing itself, but about the rights to
it. These rights determine who can use the machine or hire others (labor) to run it, but
also who can lease, collateralize or sell it. In organized production processes, machines
are part a pool of assets that is owned not by a natural, but a legal person, i.e. a
corporation. The corporation can have one or many shareholders; it can create additional
legal persons (subsidiaries) and move assets to them, while protecting the shareholders
of the parent company from it liabilities the corporation incurs. If it goes bankrupt, they
can simply walk away; conversely, if the shareholders die, the corporation continues its
legal existence. These legal structures, I argue, are central to the evolution of capital;
indeed, for the creation of private wealth, they are more important than the land, the
factories that are built on the land and the machines they house. The corporation itself is,
of course, a social structure; it exists only because the idea of legal personality was
created under specific political, economic conditions (Ciepley, 2013). Legal forms,
however, can be dislodged from the social structures that gave rise to them and rede-
ployed. They are abstractions from lived social relations, which gives them greater
versatility, but does not make them any less social.
If the argument is correct that the legal coding, rather than the thing itself, is key for
capital, then with the right legal coding anything can be coded as capital: not only
tangible objects, but expectations, ideas, even nature’s own genetic code. Only a handful
of legal modules have done most of the work over the past 400 years or so: Property,
collateral law and corporate law, the common law trust, bankruptcy and contract law.
These are the only legal devices to rank asset, grant them durability or ensure that
everyone must respect them. However, these ‘legal modules’ have dominated the private
coding of capital in the Western world for the past 400 years. They have been adapted to
fit new purposes, but their core structure has remained remarkably intact.
The book uses this relatively simple framework to show, how different assets have
been coded as capital, including land, debt, firms, and knowledge. It also shows how the
legal modules, which have their origins in domestic legal systems, have been extended to
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the transnational context. Conflict of law rules (private international law) has played a
key role in this process. They ensure that the law of other countries can be enforced in
local courts, if certain conditions are fulfilled.
The Limits of Private Law
The book focuses on private law and mostly on the handful of legal modules described
above and ignores public law. Sol Picciotto criticizes this perspective as too narrow and
argues that the interaction of public and private law is key for understanding capitalism.
In his conceptualization, private law governs the exchange of goods and public law ‘the
public sphere of politics and state consists of interactions between citizens’ (Picciotto,
above).
I have two responses. The first is to point out that current debates about globalization
are too heavily focused on public law, on regulation and de-regulation, on the retreat of
the state in favor of markets, while ignoring how deeply the state is and in fact must be
involved for these markets to exist. Anne Chadwick captures my intention well when she
writes that the book ‘is a powerful counter-narrative’ to representations that see law
entering the world of finance and markets ‘only after the fact’ and shows that ‘financial
“liberalization” has been the product of intense legal work’ (p.).
The second point is perhaps even more critical. I wish to reframe the conventional
distinction between private and public law. All law is at its core public. Even contract
law, because the choice of couching a private arrangements in legal terms implicitly
invokes the possibility of using the state’s coercive powers to enforce it. The key
question is not, whether law is or public or private, but what channels are available to
different agents for employing the coercive powers of the state in their dealings with
others, collectively and individually.
Max Weber associated modern statehood with the centralization of the means of
coercion (Weber, 1978). Law, it follows, is an (not the only) institutionalization of state
power, and it can take different forms. It can give only public figures (administrators,
courts) access to employ it against citizens in a top down fashion, allow citizens to
employ it against the state and its agents in a bottom up fashion, and/or allow private
parties to avail themselves of this power when organizing their relations with one
another. The extent to which private parties have been empowered by law is perhaps
most distinctive of different legal systems. It is very pronounced in the Western legal
traditions, more so the common law than the civil law; but less so in the Chinese legal
tradition, for example. We know from more recent research that Chinese magistrates
presided over many private disputes (Zelin, 2005); still, the code of the last major
dynasty, the Qing code, was couched primarily in terms of administrative or criminal
law (Bodde and Morris, 1973).
The evolution of capitalism coincided with the rise of the modern nation-state and its
subsequent transformation in many countries into constitutional democracies. In the
latter, public law can be understood, as Sol Picciotto suggests, as the sphere in which
citizens meet, deliberate, and self-govern. What I tried to show in the book, however, is
that the actual scope of this sphere, or the extent to which state power can be invoked as a
collective ordering device, is often curtailed by the legal empowerments that private
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parties enjoy. Within a single legal system, it may be possible to rely on public regulation
to balance the excesses of private legal ordering. In the context of multiple legal systems
with conflict of law rules that give private parties substantial leeway in picking and
choosing among them, the ability to keep a public law check and private coding strate-
gies is much attenuated. This is one of the fundamental challenges that democracies face,
I argue in Chapter 9 of the book, one that requires rolling back the scope of legal powers
that private parties enjoy.
Capital is dependent on state law, because the privileges it enjoys require the sub-
ordination of countervailing interests, if necessary by the use of force. To succeed,
capitalism therefore needs a friendly state as a host state that is willing to enforce
contracts and property rights and curtail public law interventions with private coding
strategies. With the free movement of capital, facilitated by states that dismantled entry
barriers accommodated capital by legal reforms (including substantive and conflict of
law rules), capital has gained the upper hand.
While capital is dependent on states and state law, capital’s relation to democracy is
more ambiguous – other than in a Polanyian double-movement to ensure that excesses of
private coding strategies need to be mitigated from time to time w. Without such
counter-movements, capitalism might have long succumbed to its inherent contradic-
tions, as Marx predicted. Yet, capitalism has thrived in different political and public law
regimes, including fascism in Germany and Italy, military dictatorships in Latin America
and elsewhere, even in the Peoples’ Republic of China, which is officially still a com-
munist state, but has developed a thriving shadow banking system (Awrey, 2015). In
short, I would maintain that for capital and capitalism, private law is central as long as
the state credibly commits not to interfere with private wealth creation.
Still, public law can and does play a role in creating wealth. Public corporations are
used to run utilities or sovereign wealth funds; public trusts run conservancies, envir-
onmentally protected areas, and national parks. School and university systems can be
entirely publicly organized, and even private universities are organized as non-profits,
governed by trustees with no real owner to speak of. These examples could be multiplied
and with a little imagination, we might harness private law devices for public interests.
The public benefit corporation, a privately held corporation that commits to a social goal,
has been recognized by many states in the US and will hopefully multiply in the future.
The success of these all of these arrangements, however, depends on striking the right
balance with the legal empowerment for private agents to harness the powers of the state
purely for maximizing their own, private wealth.
The ‘Golden Age’ of capitalism, the first couple of decades following World War II.,
have arguably done so. Iage Miola asks in his contribution how within my framework
one can make sense of the ‘post-war democratic capitalism’ (Wolfgang Streeck) with its
emphasis on labor law and administrative governance, not only private interests. In my
view, this period exemplifies both the promise and the fragility of configuring access to
state power in a balanced fashion. The promise is a ‘social’ market economy (a term
coined by the German minister of economic affairs, Ludwig Erhard) that combines
vibrant private legal empowerments with safeguards for labor, the environment, and the
vulnerable in society. The fragility of this balancing attempts stems from the inherent
tensions between private agents with powerful interests to pursue their interests and the
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rest. The Bretton Wood System with it public governance over foreign exchange markets
began to unravel shortly after it was instituted. Currency swaps eroded capital controls
when they were still in place, and one by one, states, repealed them and standardized core
rules to facilitate global capital mobility (Abdelal, 2007). International trade rules such
as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) began the process of creating
legal conditions for global trade and commerce beyond the reach of individual nation
states (Slobodian, 2018). Once states had dismantled barriers to entry and increased
private party autonomy for selecting the laws by which parties with the best legal advice
were willing to be governed the scope for public constraints over private power dimin-
ished. At every step along the way, states actively participated, but not in the dismantling
of state of power as often argued; rather they helped reconfigure state power in the
interest of private capital.
Striking a good balance between legally empowering private actors and enforcing
public interests is difficult, because effective public governance is always, indeed inher-
ently, more difficult than private governance. As the number of interested parties and the
heterogeneity of their interests increases, agency problems multiply and so do the costs
of decision making and monitoring. Not surprisingly, the costs of public governance and
episodes of corruption have always been a powerful weapon in the arsenal of privatiza-
tion campaigns. Modern information technologies may help reduce these costs, make
public governance more transparent and verifiable (through blockchain, for example),
but also more inclusive (i.e. through central bank digital currencies). Yet, these tech-
nologies are currently used to further expand private rather than public power (Pistor,
2020).
The Limits of a Western Legal Perspective
Iage Miola raises another limitation of the book: its focus on the experience of the Global
North. The experience of countries on the periphery, he argues, has been quite different.
‘Public law has played a much more direct role in coding capital’ and states have
engaged ‘directly in the production of wealth’ (p.). Changing perspectives and looking
to the Global North from the Global South, he suggests, might render very different
results.
This comment struck home, because I have spent most of my career teaching and
writing about legal systems on the periphery of global capitalism, about countries in
transition, emerging markets, and developing countries. The ‘Code of Capital’ is one of
very few publications about law in the core countries of capitalism, the UK and the US.
In effect, I did the kind of reverse engineering that Miola asks me to do without dis-
closing it. He captures very astutely the implications my argument in the book has for
countries on the periphery when he writes that within its framing these countries oscillate
between two extremes: they are ‘either a successful destination of transplants that har-
monize the legal modules demanded by global capital’ or are avoided or circumvented
because their legal systems do not offer ‘good prospects for coding capital’ (p.).
This, I submit, is the perspective of globally mobile, or ‘roving’ capital, and its roots
can be traced to the early days of colonization.2 It is interested in private wealth creation,
not social welfare, and picks and chooses its laws and destination countries from a menu
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of different offerings. The World Bank furthered the utilization of law for private ends
since the announcement of the Washington Consensus in 1989 (Williamson, 1990) and
has perfected it with its ‘Ease of Doing Business Index’, an annual ranking of the
‘quality’ of legal systems, which, as the name suggest is all about private business.3
Transplanting law from the core to the periphery has its origins in colonialism and has
always been closely associated with further commerce, trade and investment for the
entrepreneurs from the core, or for coding their private wealth. It should therefore come
as no surprise that in transplantees law does not enjoy the same authority as it does in the
transplantors. Indeed, an empirical study of the ‘transplant effect’, which I co-authored,
shows a marked difference in the effectiveness of legal institutions today in origin vs.
transplant countries (Berkowitz et al., 2003). We interpreted these data to suggest that
something went wrong in the process of transplanting law, that the absence of contex-
tualization or fitness of the imported rules somehow weakened their effectiveness. There
is, however, a different way of interpreting the results: The problem was not the process
but the purpose; and the latter was only too well perceived within the recipient countries.
In fact, there is evidence that legal systems, which experienced a wholesale legal trans-
plant tend to under-invest in their formal legal institutions. Comparative data are difficult
to come by on an international scale. However, historical and comparative research in the
US has shown that states that switched from French, Spanish, or German law to English
law during the colonial period, invest less in formal legal institutions even today (Ber-
kowitz and Clay, 2005).4
It is, of course, true that many peripheral countries have pursued development policies
that focused on the creation of national rather than private wealth. Some have argued that
they did not have a choice, because initial endowments of capital in private hands were
so low that they would have never been able to catch up with England had they simply
tried to emulate its development trajectory Gerschenrkon, for example, argued that
England was able to rely on a slow and decentralized process of gradual private capital
accumulation for launching its industrial takeoff (Gerschenkron, 1962).5 In comparison,
late developers relied more heavily on banks (Germany) or the state (Russia).
I do not address the question of national wealth formation in my book. National
wealth is clearly important as indicator for economic development, but it says little
about the distribution of wealth within countries. Thomas Piketty and his collaborators
have tried to compile data on wealth and income distribution for countries around the
world, which has proven difficult, because in many countries wealth data are not avail-
able.6 They do show, however, that private wealth inequalities tend to be higher than
income inequalities, Using data on income inequality, his data for South Africa show a
huge increase in income inequality after 1994, that is, in the post-apartheid era. For
Brazil, we see a substantial increase in income inequality during the Lula presidency.7 In
the two countries, the top 10 percent capture 65 (South Africa) and 56 (Brazil) percent of
income in 2012, notwithstanding massive efforts in both countries to redistribute wealth
through restitution or Bolsa Familia and similar programs. 8 Claire Debucquois, who has
written a dissertation on land rights in Brazil under my supervision, shows, how state law
enabled private wealth formation not only historically but to this day (Debucquois,
2019). The close, if not cozy relation between the elites and the government are still
present in land transactions inside Brazil, by Brazilian companies overseas as well as in
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debt assets. If anything, according to Debucquois, modern financing techniques that use
private law have further entrenched this relation.
In short, state-led development does not exclude private capital formation. I do take
the point, however, that we need to better understand the relation between the two and
this will not only the heroic data collection efforts that Piketty and his collaborators have
undertaken, but also a deep dive into the legal structures. My hope is that my book has
made a case for the latter, but it is only a first step and much work remains to be done.
The Limits of (all) Law
For all their praise for the analytical framework developed in the book, Goldoni and
Chadwick raise an even more fundamental issue, namely the limits of law itself. Both
suggest that I might have pushed the argument too far by centering so much on law and
legal coding strategies. According to Goldoni, law comes across as ‘performative’ and
that in my account the underlying ‘social relation itself is a legal exercise’. This ‘runs the
risk of producing a disembedded type of legal analysis that misses out on the dynamics of
the relevant social practices’ (p . . . ). Similarly, Chadwick suggests that ‘the balance of
the argumentation perhaps tilts too far in another direction. At times, the impression is
created that it is possible to have capital without capitalism’ (p. .)
In responding to this critique I return to Max Weber: the limits of law are defined by
the limits of law’s authority; and as with authority and legitimacy in general, it cannot be
dictated, but must be earned. Law is a social relation, it does not exist outside it; and yes,
some social relations do indeed become a ‘legal exercise’ as Goldoni put it. Law is a
social relation of a special kind, however, one that is mediated by institutional choices
that grant different agents access to the centralized means of coercion directly or indir-
ectly. This varies quite significantly across countries and legal systems. At the same
time, we should recognize that legal arrangements can be separated from a specific local
context, which is where most researchers look for ‘the social’.
Geoffrey Hodgson has argued convincingly that one of the most remarkable social
transformations has been the delegation of dispute resolution to state institutions, such as
courts (Hodgson, 2009). Suppressing social practices of self-help was a critical factor in
the rise of the modern nation-state; the other was building trust in the institutions of the
state. As Hodgson points out, law did not replace social practices; indeed, formal law
tends to be most effective when it is supported by prevailing norms. This insight finds
support in the work by Aldashev et al., who have shown that in traditional societies,
women will opt into formal law, provided this does not lead to their ostracization by their
community (Aldashev et al., 2012). Legal systems, however, also transcend existing
communities. Large, heterogenous societies are often governed by multiple sets of
norms; they are legally plural or multijural (Breton et al., 2009; Engle Merry, 1988).
Religious norms co-exist and partly overlap with civil law, and contractual practices with
social norms of trust in exchange relations. It is not uncommon for some to opt out of
formal law and rely entirely on social norms and sanctions (Bernstein, 1992; Ellickson,
1991). Transactions among strangers, however, tend to rely to a much greater degree on
formal law and the implicit threat of law enforcement. Not membership in the same
group, but mutual respect for binding commitments and enforceability is what matters in
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national, regional, and global markets. US$18.89 trillion worth of goods were exported
in 2019 according to the World Trade Organization (WTO).9 Total debt securities,
including sovereign and private debt outstanding by the end of 2019 exceeded US$ 25
trillion,10 and global equities reached US$90 trillion,11 although it is not clear from these
statistics what share of debt or equity securities is traded transnationally. Still, many of
these transactions involved crossing boundaries of spheres of exchange that are govern-
able by social norms; indeed, they regularly cross legal boundaries. Contrary to widely
held beliefs that these transactions take place in a stateless and thus lawless sphere, they
are deeply coded in law, and for the most part in private, not public law.
What kinds of societies create such structures, is an excellent question that Anne
Chadwick asks. There are two possible answers to this question. One is that societies that
have been firmly subordinated to the market principle (Polanyi, 1944); another is that
these structures operate quasi-autonomously from societies. They serve primarily parti-
cipants in global trade and finance who rely on them and trust them as long societies do
not interfere with them. In either case law has clearly been utilized to serve private,
rather than social goals, private, not national, capital formation. However, law can do so
effectively in the long run only if it enjoys respect especially by the ones who are asked
to yield to the demands of law: to the priority rights and durability claims others enjoy.
When the legitimacy of law falters, so will our capitalist order.
I agree that law does not operate in limbo outside social structures. However, I would
insist that law itself is a social relation, one that intersperses human interactions with
fairly abstract institutions. As a result, social relations have become scalable beyond
anyone’s imagination. Benedict Anderson coined the phrase of the nation states as an
‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 1991). In a similar vein, economic and financial
systems that span the globe can also be described as imagined communities that rely
not on shared identity, but on a shared reliance on the binding nature and enforceability
of legal arrangements. Importantly, these legal arrangements have, indeed demand,
effects well beyond the parties to the transactions; they need to be universal and require
others to yield to them. Herein lies the limit of law: its effects depend on its legitimacy in
the eyes of those who are asked to yield. As the beneficiaries of legal coding strategies
maximize their private gains, they are endangering the legitimacy of law as an ordering
device that is perceived as fair. In doing so they are eroding the social structures on
which they have built their private wealth.
Notes
1. Bernard Rudden, who coined the notion of the ‘feudal calculus’ that I use in the book, use the
terminology of ‘things as things’ and ‘things as value’ (Rudden, 1994) in an attempt to
translate the concepts of ‘Substanzrecht’ and ‘Wertrecht’, the German jurist Josef Kohler had
introduced (Kohler, 1901).
2. I used Mancur Olson’s image of ‘roving’ vs. ‘stationary’ bandits to describe contemporary
mobile capital in the book (Olson, 1993). See Chapter 6.
3. For the latest report, see https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings (last visited 10 July
2020).
4. For a less systematic attempt on trying to measure the effectiveness of formal law in six Asian
jurisdictions, see also (Pistor and Wellons, 1999)
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5. On late developers, see also (Amsden, 2003)
6. See also his ‘reflections’ on his book using data from the US, South Africa and Brazil,
presented in Cape Town, September 2015.
7. Ibid, slide.
8. See also the World Inequality Datebase available at https://wid.world/ (accessed 9 July 2020).
9. WTO press release of 8 April 2020, available at www.wto.org.
10. BIS Debt Securities Statistics, 3 June 2020. Available at: https://www.bis.org/statistics/sec
stats.htm.
11. See Jesse Pound, ‘Global Stock Markets Gained 17 trillion in 2019’, CNBC, 24 December
2019.
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